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Public sector performance measurement is
considered to be changing from using
predominantly output measures to using
outcome measures (Bianchi, 2016), but what
does that mean? Many dimensions are involved
in distinguishing outputs and outcomes. We
demonstrate this by presenting the changes in
performance measures in the pension system
in The Netherlands. The changes were
intended to increase transparency and to
provide more contextual and meaningful
information about performance (De Vries,
2010; Van Dooren et al., 2015). In this paper,
we look whether these expectations are
reasonable.
Recently the Dutch pension system has
changed significantly. The use of performance
measurement of pension funds reflects these
changes. The main question we address in this
paper refers to the way in which these changes
conform to a shift from output to outcome
measurement and whether such changes do
increase transparency. In order to answer these
questions, we first address the different
dimensions involved in distinguishing between
output and outcome measurement. Next, we
present the visible changes in the dominant
indicators used for the measurement of the
performance of the pension system in The
Netherlands. The paper continues with an
assessment of these changes in terms of the
different dimensions of output and outcome
measurement, after which the main question is
answered.
Outputs versus outcomes
‘Output’ and ‘outcome’ are abstract terms and
vary in their meaning according to the problem
at hand. Some see both outputs and outcomes
as impacts of policies and decisions and take
their meaning for granted. Quoting Vedung
(1997, p. 5): ‘another term for outcomes is
impacts’). According to Goodykoontz (2014, p.
3): ‘Throughout this guidebook, we use the
terms results, impacts and outcomes
interchangeably. All three terms can be used to
describe the effects of a program or activity,
particularly its achievement of or progress
toward established goals’. Others have explicitly
distinguished outputs from outcomes and
impacts. For Levy et al. (1974, p. 2) output is the
action to be undertaken following a decision.
The resulting resource allocation would denote
the outcomes and the altered lives of citizens
would be the impact. In a similar way, but
resulting in a rather different distinction, Wolf
(2010, p. 4) defines outputs as the
(self)commitments of actors, outcomes as
behavioural changes based on such
commitments and impacts as a contribution to
problem-solving or goal attainment resulting
from behavioural change. Wolf says that outputs
are verbal, outcomes imply action and impact
is effect.
This very brief introduction to the subject
highlights the variations in interpretation. Next,
we present a more extensive overview of the
variations in the meaning of the terminology in
order to ascertain the different dimensions
involved in distinguishing outputs from
outcomes and to explain the changes in
performance measurement in the Dutch
pension system must be understood.
Outcomes as changes in the input to the system
The concept of outputs relate to general systems
theory, of which the origins in political science
can be traced to Easton (1957, 1965). Easton
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does not distinguish between outputs and
outcomes. His model was an input–output
analysis, primarily about the maintenance of
the political system and its need to adapt to
technological and environmental changes, as
well as changing demands, in order to survive.
To accomplish this, the system receives inputs
(support and demands) and converts these
inputs into binding decisions (outputs). The
output results, through a feedback process, in
changed demands (input). The outputs of the
political system are also the inputs into other
systems, i.e. its environment, as well as the
changing input in its own system. According to
Easton (1957), a major task for research is to
‘establish the relationship between outputs and
succeeding inputs of the system’.
This idea was based on Von Bertalanffy’s
(1968) model for understanding systems in
general, irrespective of the scholarly discipline.
This model ‘is a circular process where part of
the output is monitored back, as information
on the preliminary outcome of the response,
into the input, thus making the system self-
regulating; be it in the sense of maintenance of
certain variables or of steering toward a desired
goal’ (Von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 161). This idea
was used by Olomu (2011): ‘When a new policy
interacts with its environment, outcomes may
generate new demands or supports and groups
in support of, or against the policy, will bring
new input (feedback) or a new policy to the
related issues’. Implicitly, this theory perceived
outcomes to be equal to changes in the input
(demands and support) to the political system,
because of the output it produces.
Outcomes as consequences of purposeful action
It was through functional theory, and especially
the theories suggested by Parsons (1949) and
Merton, that outcomes explicitly entered the
model. From this perspective, ‘output’ denotes
the manifest functions of a political system. It
refers to purposive action, i.e. conscious action
that involves motives and consequently a choice
between various alternatives. Outcomes would
refer to the consequences of such purposeful
action those elements that would not have
occurred had the action not taken place
(Merton, 1976, p. 895).
This functional theory thus perceives
outcomes as all consequences of purposeful
action (output), irrespective whether they are
intended or unintended and irrespective
whether they refer to consequences for the
system itself or its environment. In order to be
designated as ‘outcomes’, developments have
to be directly related to outputs, although they
need not only refer to the achievement of the
goals and objectives. There doesn’t need to be
a one-to-one relationship, because the effect of
outputs on outcomes can vary in different
contexts (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Pawson
and Tilley see outputs as mechanisms that in
combination with the context result in
outcomes. They point out that ‘[t]he
configurations of context, mechanisms and
outcomes explain what works for whom in
what circumstances’, resulting in the formula
‘outcomes = mechanisms + context’.
Later researchers both extended and
limited the concepts. Levy et al. (1974) asserted,
for instance, that in the public sector output is
seen in taxes and expenses, while outcomes
refer to the benefits for the citizen. Vedung
(1997) also sees output and outcomes as both
being the results of a policy. Output is meant
for phenomena that come out of government
bodies in the form of, for example, prohibitions,
enabling procedures, grant, subsidies, taxes,
exhortation, ‘jawboning’/‘moral suasion’,
services and goods. Outcomes reflect what
happens when the outputs reach the addressees.
In the same way, Forsythe (2000) claims that
‘output is the narrow measurement in numbers
of tasks accomplished, while outcome is the
broader perspective on the impact on the
environment’. Radin (2006, p. 2) considers
output as resources used, specific activities that
emerged from the organization, while outcomes
refer to the impact of those activities.
Outputs are system-oriented; outcomes context-oriented
In another interpretation, the link between
output and outcome is loosened. Output would
refer to the system delivering decisions and
policies, while outcomes are mainly related to
the environment of the system, be it because of
the way the outputs are received, or because of
other causes beyond control. Bemelmans-Videc
asserts (2007, p. 243) that there is a need ‘for a
realignment of accountability practices from
attention mainly on process or outputs, that
can (or ought to be) controlled, to much more
a focus on outcomes that cannot be completely
controlled’. Similarly, Ahmad and Eijaz (2011)
state that, output refers to decisions, while
outcomes are the development of the system in
terms of decay and progress, which may or may
not be consequences of those decisions. This
dimension emphasizes that thinking in terms
of outputs is indicative for being system-
oriented, while stressing outcomes is more
environment-oriented. Therefore, adherents
to this view tend to loosen the criterion that
outcomes need to be a consequence of outputs,
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as outcomes in the environment of the system
can appear irrespective of output from the
system.
Output as immediate effects; outcomes as intermediate
and long-term effects
A fourth dimension is time frame. Output
would be the immediate effect—more police
on the streets, more money for education,
more patients in hospital beds etc.; while
outcomes relate to intermediate and long-term
effects—for example safety, learning and
physical wellness (Afonso et al., 2010). This is
seen in a World Bank report where: ‘Country
inputs include programs and development
investments undertaken by countries to
improve fiduciary management, initiatives to
improve the quality of education, policy reforms
to improve the investment climate, etc. These
reforms, or country inputs, in turn lead to
outputs, such as, for example, reduction of
barriers to private investment, school
enrollment and immunization. Ultimately,
these outputs, over a period of time, lead to
outcomes which are overall country measures
such as gains in literacy, increased life
expectancy and lower infant mortality’ (IDA,
2002, p. 1) The same distinction appears in
other policy reports, for example Save the
Children (2008) which defines outputs as the
immediate results of project or programme
activities (for example children receive training,
community mechanisms are set up) and
outcomes as the intermediate changes as a
result of project or programme activities.
Output is what is actually done; outcomes refer to the
evaluation of what is done
Others see the difference as one between
descriptive and normative reasoning. As Smith
(1996, p. 1) said: ‘the purpose of measuring
outcome is then the valuation placed on the
activity’. He presents the formula, ‘Outcome =
Valuation (Output*Quality)’ (p. 2). In this sense,
output addresses what government does to
achieve goals; outcomes are defined in terms of
the success or failure of what government does
(Atkinson, 2002). This is also implicit in Melkers
and Willoughby (2005, p. 183) who define
outputs as the measures of the quantity of
services provided—for example, the number
of lane miles of road repaired or the number of
serious crimes reported—and outcomes as
measures of the results that occur, at least in
part, because of services provided, for example,
the percentage of lane miles of road maintained
in excellent, good, or fair condition, or the
‘clearance rate’ of serious crimes, or the
percentage of residents rating their
neighbourhood as safe or very safe. Also
according to Boyne (2002, p. 18), outcomes
include a central criterion for the evaluation of
organizational performance in the public sector:
the equity or fairness of service provision (as
assessed, for example, by the distribution of
outputs by gender, age, race, income and
geographical area).
Outcomes as micro-outputs
From a managerial point of view, output and
outcome are both inherent to the system at
hand. In this conception, outcomes also appear
inside the system. Their line of reasoning is
that you have the broad decision (the output),
but in the actual implementation you need to
know, in what way that broad decision works
out in the norms of the service-rendering
personnel and the different types of services
actually received by various groups (outcomes)
(Kirlin and Erie, 1972). This relates to the
original idea of outputs as decisions and policies
(Easton), in which the system tells what it is
going to do and outcome referring to the
realization of those intentions through the
functioning of the organization.
Outputs as easily measured and outcomes as fuzzy
concepts
A common distinction is that outputs are easily
measurable, while outcomes are often fuzzy,
more abstract and not easy to quantify—
concepts that ‘do not easily lend themselves to
quantification’ (Jacobs et al., 2013, pp. 4–5).
Raw data and measures in terms of numbers,
frequencies and percentages are outputs, while
composite measures as in one-dimensional and
multidimensional scaling and factor analysis
are outcomes. As Romzek (2000, p. 34) notes,
‘When relying on outputs, there is a tendency
to emphasize measures that are easily
obtained…Although most reforms aspire to
increase the use of outcome measures…there
are substantial difficulties in developing and
using performance indicators to measure
results’. The search for outcome measures can
be illusionary, because of the many issues at
stake (see De Vries, 2010, p. 4).
Our seven dimensions distinguishing outputs
from outcomes are summarized in table 1. The
overview and table indicate that there are
multiple ways to distinguish between the two
abstract concepts. Although there is more or
less agreement on the meaning of outputs,
there is a huge disagreement about the meaning
of outcomes.
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Dutch pension provision
From the mid 1950s onward, the Dutch pension
system has been based on the three pillar
system (OECD, 2015, p. 312) in which
government and private sector each have their
own, intertwined, roles. The three pillars
include a compulsory government organized
basic pension plan, a quasi-compulsory—
employee based—collectively but privately
organized supplement and a voluntary
individual life insurance annuity. Originally,
the system centred on the idea of a defined
benefit (DB) system based on participants’ final
salaries.
Hence, the system is hybrid, which means
that funding is based on a mixture of pay–go
benefits and capital accrual benefits. In its most
recent study, the OECD (2015, p. 312) shows
that the net replacement rate of income ranges
between 90 and 103%. This is due to the high
levels of the compulsory second pillar savings
(Allianz, 2015, p. 18; OECD 2015, p. 69).
Government is responsible for the first pillar
pay–go pensions, which are not means tested.
Everyone who has lived in the country for at
least 50 years receives the full benefit at the
retirement age of 65. The main change in
recent years, from 2013 onwards, is that the
retirement age has been gradually adjusted to
67 and could further increase based on life-
expectancy changes.
Most employees (about 90%; OECD, 2015,
pp. 189, 312) participate in quasi-mandatory
accrual-based second pillar plans. These plans
are set up by social partners (employers and
employee representatives) and run by private
independent pension plans. In most cases,
these plans are currently based on life-time
average earnings, rather than final salary
calculations (OECD, 2015, p. 313). Particularly
in single company pension plans, a trend
towards defined contribution (DC) schemes
can be observed (Frijns Committee, 2013, p.
12; Bovenberg and Gradus, 2015).
Central government in The Netherlands
has set fiscal and regulatory standards for the
pension industry. This, in combination with
the significance of privately-organized second
pillar plans, means that the pension system in
The Netherlands can be thought of as a form of
co-production between government and the
private sector (Alford, 2015). In line with
Easton’s approach on systems theory, the fiscal
and regulatory outputs of government can be
viewed as inputs into the second pillar plan
systems. On a more individual level,
government outputs in terms of first pillar
benefits are part of the inputs of the individual
income which is supplemented by the inputs of
the private second pillar benefit.
If an individual assesses the outcomes in
terms of support for the pension system as a
whole, the aggregate income from both pillars
should be in line with expectations or promises
made within the system.
The fundamentals of the system were more
or less stable until the dot-com bubble crisis in
2002. After 2002, three major changes were
introduced:
•First, the traditional final salary based pension
was replaced by an average life-time income
based system in 2004/2005 for the majority
of participants.
•Second, due to financial market developments,
the traditional calculation of liabilities was
transformed into a system based on market
rates, rather than on a fixed rate liability
calculation. This was introduced in 2007 as
part of a complete revision of the regulatory
Table 1. The seven dimensions of outputs versus outcomes.
Outputs Outcomes
System dynamics: Decisions and policies delivered System dynamics: Changes in demands to and support
by the system for (input) the system
Cause: All purposeful action seen as a means to Effect: All intended and unintended consequences
achieve goals  related to such output
System-oriented: All decisions and policies Context-oriented: All developments in the context of
delivered by the system the system either related or unrelated to the output
Time frame: The immediate effects Time frame: Intermediate and long term effects
Descriptive: What is actually done Normative: The evaluation of what is done
Nature: Intentions, words, the broad decision Nature: Actual changes in behaviour, actual
or policy definition implementation (micro-output)
Concrete: Easily measurable Abstract: fuzzy and hard to measure
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framework for pension provision.
•Third, increased longevity and fiscal distress
led to a longevity based increase in official
retirement age from 2013 onwards.
A fourth change is under consideration and
essentially focuses on a shift from a DB to a
form of DC system as advised to government by
employers and employees (SER, 2015). The
overarching effect of all these changes is that
the risks involved in the amount of pension
someone can expect have been transferred to
individuals. It is now much more difficult, if
not impossible, for individuals to calculate their
expected pensions (Frijns Committee, 2010, p.
21).
Empirical assessment
When assessing the changes in terms of outputs
and outcomes, we need to be aware of the
differences between participants. Current
practices (early 2018) make distinctions between
‘start-career, mid-career and end-career active
participants’. Furthermore, retired
participants, as well as non-active participants
not receiving benefits, can be identified. Given
the premise that accrued pension levels cannot
be affected by changes in the system, all the
changes have a forward-looking impact. So the
impact of changes and risk transfer is relatively
large for start-career participants and relatively
minor for end-career participants.
Output and outcome in the final wage DB system
In the original (pre 2007) system, the key issue
on the system level between government and
pension providers was the solvency of a plan,
defined as the available funds divided by the
liabilities discounted at a fixed 4% interest rate.
Regulation required solvency levels above 100%
and this was in general not an issue. In the mid
1990s, due to high funding levels, participants
were given premium holidays (Frijns
Committee, 2013, p. 14) and the government
discussed whether some part of the high
funding levels should be taxed. Essentially,
after taking a more risky asset allocation from
the 1990s onward, additional wealth was
accrued due to high market valuations of assets.
This development can be assessed from a
context-oriented outcome perspective: markets,
in combination with revised asset allocation by
pension plans, created substantial additional
wealth (Frijns Committee, 2010, p. 35).
There is also a time dimension in both
output as outcome in this development. The
immediate effect of premium holidays was that
the net income of participants increased,
because they did not have to save for their
pension. This generated additional legitimacy
in the short term. The long-term effect,
however, was that additional accruals came
from financial returns rather than from cost-
covering contributions. Nowadays, these
premium holidays are strongly contested,
particularly by retired participants who are
facing possible benefit cuts. So, the legitimacy
of the intervention on the long run is not as
strong as it was when the intervention was
realized.
On the individual level, an active participant
in the pre 2007 setting only had to know the
number of years he/she had participated in the
plan in order to calculate the his/her retirement
income. Basically, when working full time for
the same employer during one’s whole career
would generate simple concrete outputs and
understandable long-term effects in terms of
expected retirement income. For those not
working full time for the same employer, the
long-term outcomes were uncertain and were
often only clear at retirement.
The transition to average wage accruals
A substantial change in the second pillar pension
plans was implemented in 2004/2005.
Employers and employees, negotiating the
pension plans, took the initiative. The essential
point was that a final wage DB system was
becoming expensive mainly due to changing
demographics. The change to an average wage
DB system implied that the additional
premiums needed to cover wage increases were
no longer necessary. The immediate effect of
the change was that annual premiums stabilized
rather than increasing. The intervention
intended to reduce costs in an effort to maintain
support for, and delimit the demands on the
system as a whole, from a system dynamics
perspective. At the pension plan level, it meant
that the ex ante cost to cover premiums became
the key indicator in the annual decision on
premiums to be levied for the next year. This
seems to be a straightforward indicator, but
essentially it is an abstract concept as regulation
allows many underlying assumptions and
indicators which can be adjusted to calculate
the proposed premium. In general, only the
experts supporting pension plans really know
the impact of choices.
On an individual level, most participants
were unaware of the change (Frijns Committee,
2013, p. 14). Individuals might observe a change
in their contributions, but that was all. From
the introduction of the average wage system,
the expected income at retirement became a
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more important indicator.
To try to mitigate the effect, employers and
employees agreed on a system in which
investment returns could be used conditionally
for compensation for inflation. This led to a
new output indicator: level of compensation
for inflation granted annually. The indicator
has some system dynamics characteristics as it
is a decision. Furthermore, it is relevant from
an immediate, as well as from a long-term
perspective and has a descriptive character.
Retired plan members see their actual
compensation for inflation on their pay slip.
The accrued entitlements of other participants
also increase but are not immediately visible.
At this stage, both key indicators continued
to have a descriptive output character. The
information on expected and actual levels of
accrued annual pensions included information
on compensation for inflation. Whether or not
a gap existed between intended or expected
pension levels was not communicated.
Given that already accrued pensions up till
the systems change were not affected, the impact
in terms of outcome should be assessed on a
differentiated level.
For retired participants, a context-oriented
assessment was needed: if no compensation for
inflation us provided, their immediate
purchasing power would be affected, but
purchasing power could be affected by
government interventions as well. For
participants starting out in their careers, with
hardly any previous accrued pensions, the
impact is that they will receive a pension based
on their average life-time income. For end-
career participants, the impact is substantially
lower, only the remainder up to retirement is
affected and only if individual wage increases
more than inflation levels. A 60-year-old
participant receiving maximum level of wages
at the introduction of the average wage system
will face similar effects as retired participants.
Such differences in impact were, however, not
communicated to the public.
The 2007 regulatory framework
The original regulatory framework for pensions
was created in the 1950s. Over time, the labour
market changed and the sustainability of the
second pillar pension system was in doubt as a
result of the financial crisis and demographic
changes. Both government, employer and
employee organizations acknowledged this and
worked jointly on a revised regulatory
framework, which came into effect in 2007.
This framework formalized the already existing
practice on conditional inflation compensation.
It also changed the system of valuation of
liabilities from the previous fixed 4% system to
a market based interest rate system. This change
led to two new performance indicators, mainly
relevant for the pension plans.
The two new performance indicators are
descriptive and focus on actual market interest
rates and the level of interest rate hedging as a
tool to mitigate interest rate risk. To some
extent these indicators are input indicators
driving the financial result of the pension plan
as expressed in the funding level. The funding
level determines conditional inflation
compensation and, in case of insufficient
funding levels, interventions by the pension
plan to arrive at minimum required funding
level of 105% are needed. Hence, funding
levels and the resulting inflation compensation
became more visible to individual participants.
Although the interest rate hedge indicator
is a descriptive indicator, it also has some
characteristics of an outcome-effect indicator.
Essentially the indicator shows the impact of a
1% change in interest rate on the funding level.
Without hedging, the funding level will change
with the same amount as the duration of
liabilities.
In 2007, the new indicators were, in
practice, only relevant from a pension plan
board and regulatory perspective. In 2005/06,
the interest rate was under 4% and in 2007 it
was substantially over 4%. This meant that
liabilities decreased compared to calculations
in the previous regulatory framework. It also
suggested that the new indicators were not
seen as relevant for individual participants.
Longevity and fiscal distress
When global financial markets collapsed in
2008/09, one of the effects was that funding
levels dropped substantially below minimum
required levels. Government intervened by
adjusting the time frame for recovery from
three to five years. Due to the further decline in
interest rates, this did not realize intended
effects.
The financial crisis, as well as previous
changes in the system, had highlighted the
vulnerability of the system to external variables.
By 2010, a new and substantial variable emerged
on the public agenda. A new system of
calculating longevity by independent actuaries
and later on from the statistical office indicated
strong increases in longevity (for example Van
Ewijk et al., 2014, p. 13). Given the characteristics
of a DB plan, this meant an increase in liabilities
of some 8% and thus a similar drop in funding
level for an average pension plan. Longevity,
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however, also affects the first plan pillar plan,
because payouts for participants also will rise
each year. This, combined with fiscal distress,
led to the adjustment of retirement age from 65
to 67 years in 2021 and a fixed rule for later
adjustments in the first pillar plan and
adjustment of fiscal accrual regulations based
on a standard retirement age of 67.
At the level of co-production between
government and second pillar plans,
implementation issues were created, but no
new performance indicators. In terms of the
relationship between second pillar plans and
their participants, new indicators were
generated:
•The difference between the actual and
expected retirement age of participants
became an indicator.
•Expected retirement income had to be
adjusted on an actuarially neutral basis to
the new official retirement age. So the
expected income at retirement reported to
active participants changed. In addition,
people wanting to retire at the original 65-
year-old retirement age face lower benefits
compared to the officially reported income.
So, over time, the performance indicator
‘expected income at retirement’ changed from
a fairly concrete final salary based figure to an
abstract concept based on average life-time
income at a moving target retirement age.
Although regulations on recovery plans
were adjusted, some pension plans had to
implement substantial benefit cuts during 2013.
By mid 2015, the regulations for benefit cuts
were adjusted so that cuts can be spread over a
longer period of time and re-evaluated
annually—this creates even more uncertainty
for participants.
All the above resulted, first, in a system of
which the legitimacy is under pressure; this is
why a search for a simple and straightforward
pension system is again on the political agenda.
Second, risk is transferred to participants. For
someone wanting to assess their financial
position after retirement, two tools have been
developed. These tools are not performance
indicators but, rather, they are outcome based
tools intended to change the behaviour of
participants. The first tool is descriptive: in a
digital and government regulated environment,
all first and second pillar entitlements are
disclosed to the participant, provides an idea of
expected income after retirement. In addition,
most second pillar plans have developed
planning tools which allow to match expected
retirement income to expected expenses after
retirement.
Conclusions
We have analysed the various meanings of
output and outcome measurement, producing
seven dimensions. The definition of outcome
measurement is particularly complex. We have
identified seven dimensions of outcome
measurement ranging from very abstract to
more concrete effect-oriented approaches.
Subsequently, we used changes in the Dutch
pension system, and changes in the
performance measurement systems employed,
as an illustration of a change from output to
outcome measurement in its different
dimensions. We wanted particularly to find out
how much impact the changes had had on
transparency. If the changes in the indicators
can indeed be seen as changes from output to
outcome measurement, the main outcome
seems to be system-internal: namely the
reduction of the increasing burdens and
demands on the pension system itself. The
long-term viability of the system was the main
outcome we assessed. We did this to conform to
Easton’s idea that the outcomes as produced by
the systems’ outputs are the changes in the
input (demand and support) for the system
itself. All the other dimensions of outcome
measurement seem to be more or less
secondary.
The main outcome indicator measured the
demands placed on the pension system and its
legitimacy, which is determined partly by
contextual dynamics. As to transparency, the
new performance measures did not give the
stakeholders any more information. Instead,
the performance indicators were important for
the funds themselves and for the controlling
agency, in terms of whether they were going to
be able to take care of their liabilities in the long
run.
Our case study has shown that a change
from output to outcome measurement does
not need to be indicative for an increased
external orientation and does not by necessity
increase transparency. Rather, the case of
performance measurement in Dutch pension
funds points to the opposite, namely a focus on
the internal system and less transparency for
the stakeholders regarding the pensions they
may expect and the contributions they have to
pay.
Although pension systems, as we face ageing
societies, financial downturns and low interest
rates in the EU could be a special case, our
analysis nevertheless points to the continuing
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importance of the original systems theory in
which real outcomes are seen as to be nothing
more than the changes to system inputs.
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IMPACT
This paper highlights the pitfalls for practitioners and policy-makers of changing from
measuring output to outcomes. When designing new systems, policy-makers must ensure that
transparent outcome indicators relevant to all stakeholders are used.
